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In machine scheduling the first problem is to find a timetable that is optimal with respect to some efficiency criterion. 
If the jobs come from different clients the solution of the optimization problem is not the end of the story. In addition, 
we have to decide how the minimal total cost must be distributed among the parties involved. In this note, cost allocation 
problems will be considered to arise from one-machine scheduling problems with an additive and weakly increasing cost 
function. We will show that the cooperative games related to these cost allocation problems have a nonempty core. 
Furthermore, we give a rule that assigns a core element of the associated cost saving game to each scheduling problem 
of this kind and an initial order of the jobs. 
Traditionally, a scheduling problem is the task to find a timetable that is optimal with respect 
to some efficiency criterion. An efficiency criterion 
defines an order on the set of feasible timetables and 
the problem is to find an optimal one. The efficiency 
criterion is usually given by a function of the job 
completion times and the timetable is better if the 
function value is lower. 
In practice, the jobs to be processed often come 
from different clients, and they are only interested in 
an efficient processing of their own jobs. Hence, there 
is a controversy between social benefit and individual 
benefits. In this note, we deal with the problem of 
reconciling these two visions. 
More concretely, we are going to investigate the 
following: 
a. there are n jobs to be processed on one machine; 
each job can start at time t = O; 
b. different jobs come from different clients; 
c. each client is using an efficiency criterion 
represented by a weakly monotonic function of the 
completion time of his job; 
d. the total efficiency function is the sum of the effi-
ciency functions of the clients; 
e. there is an initial order u 0 : N ~ { 1, ... , n} and 
client i can derive from this order the right to be 
processed in the u 0(i)th time slot, i.e., in the time 
period [t,, t; + p;] with t; = I,,..""oUJ<uoUJ Pj· 
An efficiency function that satisfies properties c and d 
is called an additive and regular efficiency function. 
The problem is the distribution of the cost savings 
that can be made by changing the initial order into 
another order. One could avoid the problem and pro-
pose an equal split of the benefits. We will, however, 
follow a more sophisticated approach, taking into 
account the "virtual cost savings that coalitions of 
clients could have made." 
So, we have a set N of n clients each having one job 
to be processed on one and the same machine. The 
type of client i is determined by the weakly monotonic 
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efficiency function Ji: R+ ..-.+ R and the processing 
time Pi > 0 of the job. There is an initial order 
ao: N ..-.+ { 1, ... , n} which gives each client a rank-
ing number. Any order a:N --+ {1, ... , n} deter-
mines a, what is called semi-active timetable T = 
(t1, · ·., tn) wherein t; := ICT(il<CT(iJ pj is the time 
that job i can start. Then, assuming no pre-emption or 
interruption, the completion time of job i is C; = 
t; + Pi· As the efficiency functions Ji are weakly 
monotonic it makes no sense to look at other (not 
semi-active) timetables. 
If we consider a coalition of clients S C N, this 
group of clients can also generate cost savings by 
changing their processing order. In this paper we 
assume: 
f. coalitions S are only allowed to change position 
within groups that are connected in S with respect 
to the initial order Oii; if there are, for example, five 
clients and the initial order is 1 < 2 < · · · < 5, 
coalition (1, 2, 4, 5) can only switch the position of 
jobs 1 and 2 or jobs 4 and 5 (or both), but a switch 
2 - 4 is not allowed. 
Now we can define v(S) as the maximal cost sav-
ings that coalition S can produce by changing posi-
tions within a 0-connected groups ( = a0-components). 
Then we have a cooperative game v: 2N --+ R with 
S -+ v(S). Notice that the game v depends on the 
initial order a0, that v(N) is the total benefit to be 
distributed among the clients and that one-person 
coalitions cannot generate any cost savings, i.e., 
v(i) = 0 for all i EN. 
A natural question is whether the total cost savings 
v(N) can be distributed among the clients in such a 
way that each coalition at least obtains the benefit 
they can generate by themselves. A distribution is 
lacking in stability if this is not the case. A coalition S 
that obtains less than the profit they can produce by 
themselves may be tempted to split off and follow 
their own way of action. Therefore, the question is: Is 
there a vector x E RN such that 
:L x; = v(N) and 2: x; ;;!: v(S) for all S C N? 
iEN iES 
In the theory of cooperative games such a distribution 
x is called a core allocation of the cooperative game 
v:2N ~ R. 
In this note we show that the cost saving games 
generated by scheduling problems of the type we 
described before have core allocations, or more pre-
cisely, we will give a simple rule which assigns a core 
allocation of the associated game to each scheduling 
problem of this type. As turns out, it will only be 
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necessary to compute the values of 2n - 1 coalitions 
to find this core allocation. 
In the literature there are two papers dealing with 
the issues we are talking about. In Tijs et al. (1984) the 
cost for job i to be processed on the jth place is given 
and coalitions are allowed to make any switch of 
position. The cost saving games arising from such 
permutation situations have been proved to have core 
allocations. In Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs (1989) the 
efficiency functions are linear in the completion time 
and a rule is given (the equal gain splitting rule) which 
assigns to each sequencing situation a core allocation 
of the associated cost saving game. The allocation rule 
we give in this paper is an extension of the EGS 
rule to more general situations. The sequencing games 
of Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs are convex games, i.e., 
v(S) + v(T) ~ v(S U T) + v(S n T) for all coalitions 
S, T C N. The existence of core allocations is implied 
by this fact. The games we are going to consider are, 
in general, not convex. 
Let us complete this Introduction with an example. 
Example. Let N consist of three clients with the ef-
ficiency functions: 
/1(C) :=0.5C,f2 (C) := 4 ifC>3, 
/2(C) :=O ifC~3, 
[J(C) := max (0, C - 4). 
So client 1 is paying half of his completion time, client 
2 is paying a penalty of 4 if his job is completed after 
t = 3, and client 3 has due date 4 and is paying his 
tardiness. Let the processing times be (p 1,p2,p3) = 
(2, 2, 2) and a0 : 1 -< 2 < 3. The cost saving game has 
the values v(123) = 4, v(12) = 3, and v(23) = 2. 
This game is not convex as v(12) + v(23) > 
v(l23) + v(2). The ,B-rule (as we will define below) 
gives the core allocation (1, 2.5, 0.5). 
1. THE~ RULE 
If (N, v) is a cooperative game and a0 :N-+ {1, ... , 
n} is an ordering of the players, the /3 rule is defined 
by the formula 
{3;(v) := 1h[v(Pr(i, a 0 )) - v(Pr(i, au)) 
+ v(F(i, a 0 )) - v(F(i, cru))], 
where Pr(i, cr0), Pr(i, a0 ), F(i, o-0), and F(i, o-o) 
are the coalitions {j E N\a0(j) ~ ao(i)}, {j E 
N\cr0(j) < a 0(i)}, {j E N\u0(j) ::i a 0(i)}, and 
{j E N\a0(j) > cr0(i)}, respectively. Every coordi-
nate /3;(v) is the average of the marginal of i in the 
coalition consisting of the players preceding i and in 
the coalition of players following i with respect to the 
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initial order o-0 • In general, the f3 rule does not give a 
core allocation of the game, but it does for games that 
arise from one-machine scheduling problems satisfy-
ing conditions c-f. 
Theorem. If (N, v) is a cooperative game generated 
by a one-machine scheduling problem with an addi-
tive and regular efficiency criterion, the f3 rule gives a 
core allocation of the game. 
The proof follows from the next two propositions. 
The first proposition gives conditions for a coopera-
tive game that guarantees that the f3 rule gives a core 
element. The second proposition states that one-
machine scheduling problems (with additive and reg-
ular efficiency criterion) generate games with these 
properties. 
Proposition 1. The {3-rule gives a core element of a 
cooperative game (N, v) if 
a. the game is superadditive (i.e., v(S) + v(T) :;:; v 
(S U T) whenever S n T = ~); 
b. the game is u0-component additive (i.e., v(S) = 
Ires/uo v(T) where S!o-0 is the collection of com-
ponents of S under the order u 0). 
Proof. Take any u0-connected coalition T and sup-
pose that T = {i E Nia :;:; u0 (i) :;:; b}. Writing Pr(i) 
instead of Pr(i, o-0), the {3 rule gives for coalition T 
2 L (3;(v) = L [v(Pr(i)) - v(Pr(i)) 
iET iET 
+ v(F(i)) - v(F(i))] 
= [v(Pr(u01(b))) - v(Pr(u0 1(a))) 
+ v(F(uo1(a))) 
- v(F(u01(b)))];:: 2v(T). 
The second equality is obtained by canceling equal 
terms from the first expression and the inequality 
follows from superadditivity, and 
Pr(u01(a)) u T = Pr(u0 1(b)) 
and 
TU F(u01(b)) = F(u0- 1(a)). 
If T = N(a = 1 and b = n) we obtain: 
2 2: /3;(v) = v(Pr(u01(n))) + v(F(a-0 1(1))) 
iEN 
= 2v(N). 
For non-u0-connected coalitions the core inequalities 
follow from u0-component additivity. 
Proposition 2. Every one-machine scheduling prob-
lem with an additive and regular cost criterion gives 
rise to a cost saving game that is superadditive and 
u0-component additive. 
Proof. If S and T are disjoint coalitions we can com-
bine any action of S with any action of T to a feas-
ible action of S U T. The cost savings of the combined 
action is the sum of the profits yielded by the action 
of S and T. This gives the superadditivity of (N, v). 
From the definition of v it follows immediately that 
the game is u0-component additive. 
The proof of the theorem follows from Propositions 1 
and 2. 
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